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Stephen F. Diamond
Jennifer W. Kuan
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 7, 2006, the New York Stock Exchange announced
the completion of its merger with publicly traded Archipelago
Holdings, Inc., thus finishing its transformation from a nonprofit
membership organization to a standard for-profit corporation.1
The decision to change organizational form - to "demutualize" -
caps a decade-long trend among stock exchanges around the
world.2 The arguments in favor of demutualization offered in the
scholarly and popular literature are varied. They typically con-
tend that a for-profit firm is better able to make new investments,
especially in technology, and that for-profits are more responsive
to heightened competition from other exchanges. It is also argued
that, by placing the assets of an exchange in a corporation whose
shares itself are traded, the competitive pressures of the capital
markets will drive the new entity to more efficient behavior than
that of the "clubby," insular - and outdated - nonprofit.
But few have considered the possibility that the NYSE in its
nonprofit form was an efficient organization. Despite dramatic
changes in its surrounding environment, the NYSE maintained
that form for more than 200 years, undergoing only moderate
structural change in response to periodic crises. Right up to its
debut as a publicly traded for-profit, the NYSE remained the sin-
gle largest and most prestigious exchange in the world.' We wish
to consider whether or not that stability of form was a rational
response to a so-called "lemons" problem. Economist George Aker-
lof stated the lemons problem in its classic form when he argued
1. See NYSE Group, News Release, New York Stock Exchange/Archipelago Holdings
Merger Complete, Mar. 7, 2006, available at http://www.nyse.com/press/ 1141729824519.html.
2. RUBIN LEE, WHAT IS AN EXCHANGE? THE AUTOMATION, MANAGEMENT, AND
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS (1998).
3. Jennifer Hughes & John Authers, Taking the Floor: How a Screen Role Will Chal-
lenge New York's Market Debutant, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at 13.
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that asymmetric' information between buyers and sellers in the
market for used cars would allow bad cars to drive out good cars
over time." At the NYSE, the potential for a lemons problem ex-
ists because of the difficulty in extracting truthful information
about firms whose shares trade on the NYSE (Issuing Firms) and
then persuading investors of that truthfulness.
To analyze the nonprofit NYSE as the solution to an informa-
tion problem, we apply a theory that views a nonprofit as a con-
sumer-owned entity. In particular, we describe a general model of
nonprofits in which the highest demanding consumers of a non-
rival good organize themselves to produce that good together. In
the case of the NYSE the non-rival good is "liquidity," which we
define as the ability to act in the market as a price-taker and
which provides enormous benefits to Issuing Firms and investors.
The high demanders are financial intermediaries; thus, we focus
our attention on investment banks for the purposes of understand-
ing the lemons problem. As intermediaries between large inves-
tors and firms seeking to issue securities, banks have special ac-
cess to information from issuing firms.
How does a nonprofit NYSE, organized by investment bankers
to produce liquidity, overcome its lemons problem? We describe
two mechanisms that bankers might employ. First, during the
listing process, bankers research prospective issuers and screen
out bad firms. A second mechanism, which has been observed in
venture capital (VC) deals,5 is the exchange of "hostages" to moti-
vate truthful disclosure of information by insiders at issuing firms.
Insiders always know more about their firms than outside bank-
ers, no matter how sophisticated the diligence process. Informa-
tion quality is always a potential problem, since insiders may wish
to misrepresent the financial condition of their firms.' As under-
writers, bankers allocate shares of an IPO to the insiders of other
listed firms. These IPO allocations typically come with an expec-
tation that the shares be held for some period of time (a "lock-up"
4. George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489-490 (1970).
5. Jennifer Kuan, The Role of Hostages in Establishing Venture Capital Networks,
2005, available at http'//siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST Seminars/ Role of Hostages in
VC.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
6. The literature on the problem of inside managers taking advantage of outside in-
vestors is vast and reaches back to Smith and Marx, but the classic statement is ADOLF A.
BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
For a recent review of the problem, see William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the
Century's Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001).
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period), Internet-bubble behavior notwithstanding. This lock-up
served a dual purpose, stabilizing the stock price of a new issue
and creating mutual vulnerabilities to bad information among in-
siders of issuing firms. That is, if the CEO of an issuing firm were
to lie about his firm to the investing public, insiders at other listed
firms who own shares in his firm, i.e. peers, would suffer as well.
While this may not seem a large deterrent, and does not perhaps
rise to the level of hostage taking in VC financing, we believe
there are indications that scrutiny by one's peers matters.
During the 200-year history of the NYSE's operation as a non-
profit, first as a membership association and later as a formal
nonprofit corporation, the Exchange's members7 carefully decided
which firms could trade on the Exchange and then extracted hos-
tages in order to motivate firms to disclose information truthfully.
With the demutualization of the NYSE now complete, the era of
the banker-owner is at an end. What does a for-profit NYSE por-
tend? We argue that as bankers relinquish ownership of the Ex-
change they also give up control of the Exchange and will thus
also give up their formal role as gatekeepers. The for-profit Ex-
change will assume the role of gatekeeper. But if the business
model of existing for-profit exchanges like Archipelago are any
guide, a for-profit exchange, which profits directly from trading
volume, is unlikely to be as selective as bankers, who profited only
indirectly from trading profits.' But selection is only part of the
7. For the purposes of this paper we will not discuss whether there is a significant
difference between the period of investment banking dominance of the Exchange and the
pre-banker dominant period of the Exchange. As one history of the earliest activity of the
Exchange demonstrates, the Exchange (then called the New York Stock and Exchange
Board) itself served as gatekeeper for new listings during that earlier period. See Stuart
Banner, The Origin of The New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27 J. LEGAL STUDIES 113,
127-28 (1998). As far back as 1869 the Exchange had created listing standards assuring
investors that they had accurate information regarding the capital structure of firms. See
Paul G. Mahoney, The Allocation of Government Authority: The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV.
1453, 1461-1462 (1997). We assume here for the sake of argument that a form of hostage
taking has prevailed during at least the investment banking dominant period. There is
some evidence that it was in fact the rise to prominence of the investment banks' role in
listing securities, complete by 1900, rather than later federalization of disclosure require-
ments, that was key to the establishment of a credible modern disclosure regime. See J.
Bradford De Long, Did J.P. Morgan's Men Add Value? An Economist's Perspective onFinancialCapital-
ism, 1990, available at http://www.0-bradford-delong.net/pdf files/MorganTemin.pdf (last visited Feb.
18, 2007); Mahoney, supra, at 1469-70. In fact, more detailed historical work may demon-
strate that the modern hostage system emerged only after trial and error. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the Exchange had to weather quite volatile periods in its early years as
non-repeat players behaved opportunistically. For detailed discussion of the hostage
mechanism in the modern era, see discussion in Part IV.D. infra.
8. Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demu-
tualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 367 (2002).
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NYSE's success. Unless a for-profit exchange can also facilitate
hostage exchange through IPO allocations, firms' incentive to dis-
close will never be as great as under nonprofit ownership of the
NYSE. Without hostages motivating issuers to disclose,9 the qual-
ity and reliability of information they provide will deteriorate and
a lemons problem could potentially reemerge.
II. LITERATURE ON EXCHANGE DEMUTUALIZATION
Much of the literature on stock exchange demutualization fo-
cuses on various perceived weaknesses of the non-profit mutual
organization." According to this literature, decision-making at a
nonprofit exchange is problematic because nonprofit decisions re-
quire consensus," respond to a median voter that shifts as mem-
bership diversifies, 2 or produce an increasingly insular, "clubby"
membership. 3 Demutualization should bring about better, faster
decisions as the for-profit responds to the market for corporate
control, 4 by investing in new technology, for example. 5 The tim-
ing of demutualization is largely seen as being brought about by
new competition from electronic communications networks, or
ECN's, 6 but also by an increase in trading volume internationally,
the integration of capital markets globally, and decimalization. 7
9. It should go without saying that there is little evidence that the agency and other
problems that cause opportunistic behavior by firms' senior insiders have diminished as the
Exchange has moved towards demutualization. Consider, for example, the recent outbreak
of manipulation of stock options, particularly in the high tech sector. See Mark Boslet &
Mark Maremont, Options Backdating Scheme Gets Aired Out, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2007,
available at http://online.wsi.com/article/SBI17176028286012442.html? mod=2 1227 1.
10. Lee provides a descriptive catalogue of recent stock market demutualizations
around the world. See LEE, supra note 2. On the world of emerging alternative trading
systems, see generally Karmel, supra note 8.
11. See Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Ex-
changes, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 105, 113 (2002).
12. Oliver Hart & John Moore, The governance of exchanges: members' cooperatives
versus outside ownership, 12 OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY. 53 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey &
Maureen O'Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58
STAN. L. REV. 563 (2005).
13. Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as Usual? 21
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 657 (2001).
14. Id. at 668-669.
15. Aggarwal supra note 11.
16. ECN's are electronic trading platforms that allow buyers and sellers to match or-
ders directly without routing the order to a broker-dealer (Nasdaq) or specialist (NYSE).
The Nasdaq is an "alternative trading system" because it is simply a network of broker-
dealers without a trading floor or specialists. Arguments for an ECN include the possibility
of faster execution, greater transparency and better pricing. Archipelago owns and oper-
ates a major ECN.
17. Karmel, supra note 8, at 368.
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Notes of caution have been sounded, however, as the merits of
the nonprofit form are acknowledged. For instance, the nonprofit
exchange is thought to be more responsive to regulation."i It may
also be that certain rules, including high listing standards and a
difficult delisting process, helped firms that list on the NYSE sig-
nal their quality and commitment. 9
We depart from the existing literature on demutualization by
considering the possibility that the non-profit form actually cre-
ated important efficiencies that will be lost upon demutualization.
We view the nonprofit member firm as a more efficient form of
organization than the newly emerging for-profit exchanges. We
speculate later on why an entity would choose to demutualize
when doing so would be inefficient. But we do note here that, in
practice, the move to demutualize was less straightforward than
the literature would suggest. That is, if demutualization were in
fact more efficient, why has it taken so long to implement? The
possibility of alternative trading systems based on computerized
networks first emerged in the 1960s. The argument that the pri-
vate club-like form of the Exchange was "archaic" was vetted in
the 1930s."° Yet, the first exchange to demutualize was Sweden's
Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993.1 As early as 1999, NYSE
President Richard Grasso testified to Congress that he was in fa-
vor of a shift to the for-profit form and that the Board of the Ex-
change had already begun the process.22 Yet the NYSE delayed
the change, "apparently because of internal tensions."23 It took
another seven years and a change in leadership to accomplish de-
18. James Cox, The Future Content of the U.S. Securities Laws: Premises for Reforming
the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (2000);
Macey and O'Hara, supra note 12, at 573.
19. Macey and O'Hara, supra note 12, at 570.
20. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION § 7-B-2 (3d ed. 2006) (citing
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, 64-65 (1940) ("Operating as private-
membership associations, exchanges have always administered their affairs in much the
same manner as private clubs. For a business so vested with the public interest, this tradi-
tional method has become archaic").
21. Karmel, supra note 8, at 368.
22. Public Ownership of U.S. Stock Markets: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs Comm., 106th Cong., Statement of Richard Grasso, Chairman and CEO
of New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 1999 (stating that demutualization is "critically needed
to assure the continued competitiveness and position of the NYSE as the world's pre-
eminent equity market").
23. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing towards the top?: The impact of cross-listings and stock
market competition on international corporate governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002).
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mutualization." One explanation, of course, is that the "en-
trenched" interests of "insular" Exchange members delayed the
inevitable.25 In fact, when the move to demutualize was finally
made in the wake of the ouster of Grasso, a frequent view ex-
pressed in the media was that Grasso himself had blocked the re-
form in order to protect those entrenched interests.26 But in his
Congressional testimony, Grasso raised many of the same argu-
ments as those found in the scholarly literature. If the presumed
leading defender of insular member interests at the Exchange was
in favor of for-profit status yet was unable to carry out such a re-
form, an alternative explanation for the failure to complete the
transition much earlier than 2006 is required. We contend that
the nonprofit form benefited members, as well as the Issuing
Firms and investors they served, and thus preserving with that
structure was rational.27
III. A CONSUMER-OWNED MODEL OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION
While much of the scholarly literature on nonprofits mirrors the
popular notion that they are inefficient, we apply a model that
shows how nonprofits can be economically efficient, even achieving
first-best efficiency.28 In this model, the highest demanding con-
sumers of a nonrival good organize to produce the good.29 Because
high demanders are able to organize, they also have more infor-
mation about demand than a for-profit entrepreneur. This infor-
24. Significant shifts in NSYE governance structure have been rare. Stability has been
the norm. The two most notable "constitutional moments" for the Exchange, prior to this
year's transition, occurred in 1938 and 1971. In the wake of the Depression era, Whitney
Scandal the Exchange opened up its Board of Governors to directors representing the in-
vesting public. After the "back office" crisis of the late 1960s the Exchange made a formal
move to non-profit corporate status under New York law. See RICHARD J. TEWELES &
EDWARD S. BRADLEY, THE STOCK MARKET, 133 (7' ed. 1998). For a discussion of the Ex-
change's ability to adopt new modern standards over time, see Mahoney, supra note 7.
25. Leon Lazaroff, NYSE trading on future stock sale, merger for future, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 26, 2006, at 9 ("That the NYSE is making this transition 2 1/2 years after Grasso
resigned is extraordinary when one considers the vigor with which observers said he re-
sisted change in order to preserve specialist sovereignty").
26. Id. ("uproar over the former chairman and chief executive's hefty pay package was
essential in forcing change on an insular institution").
27. We can, of course, only speculate as to the reasons for the delay. If Coffee, supra
note 23, is right that Grasso's push for a change was met with internal tension, that ten-
sion may have reflected debate over the relative value of retaining the hostage system
versus the potential for short term gains by selling out one's membership.
28. Jennifer Kuan, The Phantom Profits of the Opera: Non-profit Ownership in the Arts
as a Make-Buy Decision, 17 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 2 (2001).
29. A nonrival good is one where one party's use of it does not diminish its value to
others.
Vol. 9
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mational advantage allows more efficient price discrimination and
is the source of economic efficiency. The following is a simple nu-
merical example to illustrate the basic idea, which we then apply
to the NYSE.
Suppose a non-rival good of a certain quality costs $1000 to pro-
duce (assume higher quality costs more, lower quality less). De-
mand consists of two "high" types and ten "low" types. High types
have a high willingness to pay; in this case, both high types are
willing to pay $500 each for the good. Since the good is non-rival,
their combined $1000 is exactly enough to pay for the good. Low
types have a low willingness to pay; in this case, each low type is
willing to pay $10. Together, the low types are only willing to pay
$100.
Assume that a profit-maximizing entrepreneur knows the de-
mand curve, i.e. two high types willing to pay $500 each and ten
low types willing to pay $10 each, but he cannot distinguish high
types from low types. According to canonical price discrimination
models, the entrepreneur must produce a lower quality product
that sells at a price all can afford, or produce two goods, a high
quality-high priced one and a low quality-low-priced one. In either
case, the entrepreneur makes a profit, and the high types come
away with some consumer surplus. That is, the entrepreneur and
the high types share the surplus.
Assume also that high types know the demand curve; in particu-
lar, they know that they are the only two high types. Now sup-
pose that the two high types have the ability to work together and
produce the good themselves. Together, they put in $500 each and
produce a $1000 quality good. Since the two high types know each
other and their willingness to pay, they also know that the other
ten consumers are low types. That is, they have perfect informa-
tion about demand, something the entrepreneur did not have.
They charge the low types $10 to consume the good, which they
then keep. They get the entire surplus, in this case, $100 in total
or $50 each. Observe that this firm has the appearance of a non-
profit firm. Revenues for the good are $120 ($10 each from 12
consumers). The cost of producing the good is $1000. The high
types make up the difference, or $880. This amount appears to be
a donation when, in fact, it comes from the high types' willingness
to pay.
Since the high types have perfect information about demand,
they reap the total surplus and can never do better by buying from
a for-profit entrepreneur. What is needed for a nonprofit organi-
2007
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zation, however, is 1) non-rivalry in the good and 2) the ability of
high types to organize around their information. If the two high
types did not know each other, or could not come together to pool
their resources, then the nonprofit firm would not arise. In prac-
tice, these obstacles can be enormous. In the model derived by
Kuan, wealthy members of "Society" who socialized regularly pro-
duced operas and used age-old rules of etiquette to extract contri-
butions.3" Note that these social pressures were essential to fi-
nancing production and to economic efficiency, and a for-profit
entrepreneur, who would have been an outsider, could not have
used them. Thus, even if the entrepreneur had information about
wealthy individuals, perhaps from the Social Registry, he would
still need a mechanism for extracting payment. Society mavens
have such a mechanism; entrepreneurs do not.
1V. THE NYSE AS A CONSUMER OWNED NONPROFIT
How does a model of nonprofit organization - developed in the
context of opera companies - apply to the NYSE? In the stylized
model above, a nonprofit is formed to produce a nonrival good us-
ing mechanisms to extract contributions from high types. In the
benign case of operas, opera performances are the nonrival good,
and long-standing social rules serve as a mechanism among the
wealthy to get rich patrons to pay their fair share. In the case of
the NYSE, liquidity is a nonrival good produced by financial in-
termediaries who use a number of mechanisms to elicit truthful
information from insiders at Issuing Firms.
A. LIQuIDITY
A stock exchange provides a marketplace for arms-length trad-
ing of securities; a marketplace that creates liquidity and all the
benefits that liquidity brings. A world without such a market-
place would resemble today's private equity market where a small
group of professionals raise funds with money from wealthy indi-
viduals and institutional investors. Typically, private equity firms
include buyout funds that buy distressed firms and install new
management, and venture capital firms that finance risky start-
ups. Buyout funds purchase all of the outstanding shares of pub-
licly traded firms, thus eliminating the separation of ownership
30. Kuan, supra note 28.
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and control enabling direct management of firm operations by the
new owners. Venture capital firms use a variety of contractual
constraints to control the managers of the startup firms they back.
The wealthy individuals and institutional investors who invest in
these private equity funds as limited partners of the professional
managers lack an impersonal and liquid market for their invest-
ments. To exit a private equity investment before the prescribed
date (usually ten years), an investor must find a buyer for her in-
vestment. A secondary market for these limited partnership in-
terests now exists, but its available capital is still relatively small.
In addition, general partners of private equity funds discourage
limited partners from considering such an alternative exit. 1 The
absence of liquidity, of course, negatively impacts asset prices,
even in publicly traded securities.32 Thus, the sale of limited part-
nership interests in private equity funds for pennies on the dollar
is not unusual.33
In contrast to the severe constraints of such a private market,
an ideal public market has prices that change smoothly, that can
be observed almost continuously, and provides brokers, specialists
or market makers who facilitate finding a buyer. The specialists
and market makers are willing, even required, to serve as a buyer
or seller of last resort. Also, with many buyers and sellers partici-
pating in the market, prices reflect the combined knowledge of
these participants.34 Finally, recent corporate accounting scandals
notwithstanding, NYSE-traded firms make regular and, far more
frequently than not, accurate public disclosures. By contrast, ven-
ture capital funded start-ups are extremely risky, tight-lipped,
and unpredictable.
31. Matthew Sheahan, Portfolio For Sale, VEN. CAP. J., June 1, 2005, available at
http://www.ventureeconomics.con/vci/Srotected/I 1 10466090915.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
32. Marc Reinganum, Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: An Empirical Investi-
gation of NYSE and Nasdaq Securities, 28 J. FIN. ECON. 127 (1990); David Easley, Soeren
Hvidkjaer, and Maureen O'Hara, Is Information Risk a Determinant of Asset Prices?, 57 J.
FIN. 2185 (2002); M.J. Brennan & A. Subrahmanyam, Market Microstructure and Asset
Pricing: On the Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock Returns, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 441 (1996);
and Alexander W. Butler, Gustavo Grullon & James P. Weston, Stock Market Liquidity and the Cost of
Raising Capital (2002), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=354720 (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
33. Interview with one of the authors, partner, secondary venture capital fund, 2005
(transcript on file with author).
34. The NYSE requires even heavily traded listed companies to have a minimum of 500
shareholders while companies conducting an IPO must have 2000 shareholders. See
NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §102.00, available at http://www.nvse.com/ Frame-
set.html?nvseref=http%3A//www.nvse.com/reulation/listed/1147474807344.html&displaVP
age=/lcm/1078416930672.html?enable=subsection&snumber--l&&ssnumber-102.00 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2007).
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The ease of trading and abundant information that a NYSE list-
ing brings to individual investors has helped generate wide par-
ticipation in the stock market by individual, so-called "retail," in-
vestors. This widespread participation increases liquidity and,
therefore, benefits the firms whose shares trade on the NYSE.
Thus the NYSE, as an intermediary institution, serves investors
and listing firms by creating price enhancing liquidity. We will
argue in the next sections that the NYSE does this by ensuring
information is reliable and truthful, thus solving a "lemons" prob-
lem.
B. OWNERS
According to a consumer-owned model, the owners of a nonprofit
are also the consumers with the most to gain. While liquidity
benefits all investors and publicly traded firms, the biggest benefi-
ciaries are, in principal, easily identified as NYSE "seat holders"
or members. Unfortunately, seat holders are identifiable to us in
principal only because, in practice, membership rolls are private
information. Nevertheless, press estimates and De Long's histori-
cal account each suggest that investment banks dominate mem-
bership decisions.35
There are members with other functional expertise, however,
such as broker-dealers, who service retail customers. By provid-
ing millions of small investors with access to the NYSE, broker-
dealers provide a valuable component of liquidity. Specialists are
firms that manage the trading activity for issuing firms. Each
issuing firm selects a single specialist firm, giving that specialist a
monopoly over transactions in that issuing firm's stock. A lucra-
tive business, specialists also provide a valuable service to the Ex-
change, acting as buyer and seller of last resort. As such, the spe-
cialist uses her own account to ensure that prices move in small
increments. While maintaining price quality can be risky - stock
market crashes have put many a specialist out of business - it also
contributes to investor confidence. On ECN's, in contrast, where
customers' buy and sell orders are matched with each other, thin
after hours trading has produced large, unsettling price disconti-
nuities.
Each of these three types of members of the NYSE serves an
important function for the nonprofit. Certain mechanisms hold
35. De Long, supra note 7.
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these fiercely competitive firms together within the Exchange,
constraining their behavior for the production of liquidity, the
nonrival good that they can each benefit from. Among these
mechanisms are internal rules and multi-lateral contracts. How-
ever, for the purposes of this paper, we focus on the information
problem associated with liquidity and the use of hostages to sup-
port a solution to that problem.
C. THE "LEMONS" PROBLEM AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
QUALITY
There are a number of inputs into the production of liquidity.
Typically, the existing literature explores the positive effect that
regulation has had on expanding the volume of trading on equity
markets and the positive role that an independent judiciary has
on enforcing privately negotiated contracts. Less attention has
been paid, however, to the effect that quality of information has on
stock markets. In the wake of the most recent corporate scandals,
where, for example, fraudulent disclosures were used by Enron to
cheat investors, we believe that providing information remains a
problem for exchanges even with regulation and a supportive con-
tract law regime.
As suggested above, Akerlof argued that the used-car market
suffers from a similar information problem.36 In this market, in-
formation about the quality of a faulty used car, a so-called
"lemon," is indistinguishable from the information about a non-
faulty used car because of the information asymmetry between
buyers and sellers. Thus, buyers must apply a lemon discount to
all cars that depresses the price for good and bad used cars alike
and thus, in turn, discourages owners of non-faulty used cars from
entering the market. The result is that, like Gresham's Law (bad
money drives out good), lemons drive out non-lemons, in a race to
the bottom.
In the context of stock exchanges, Macey and O'Hara recognize
the potential for opportunism and the role of the NYSE's self-
regulatory arm in countering it. 7 They argue that it is important
to recognize the difference between the ex ante willingness of an
issuer "to opt into a set of efficient legal rules to prevent or impede
later diversions of wealth from investors" such as those required
36. Akerlof, supra note 4.
37. Macey and O'Hara, supra note 12, at 585-588.
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by a demanding self regulated exchange and the ability of an is-
suer, ex post, to take advantage of a world which offers multiple
listing venues some of which may be indifferent to such opportun-
istic behavior.38 Thus, "management has an incentive to renege on
the agreements it has made with investors whenever possible. In
today's environment of multi-venue trading, the problem of such
ex post opportunistic behavior looms quite large." 9
Issuing firms have much to gain by misrepresenting informa-
tion, whether that information comes from accounting records,
clinical tests, or business prospects. Recent history has shown
that there are myriad ways to deceive the investing public and
myriad incentives to do so. Thus, when it comes to the production
of quality information, the problem is one of eliciting truthful dis-
closure from Issuing Firms.
D. MECHANISMS
How do owners of the NYSE elicit the truth? We focus on in-
vestment banks because they have the most information about
Issuing Firms, and, as intermediaries between firms and inves-
tors, probably also have the most to lose from deceit. We identify
two methods that bankers use to overcome information asymme-
try: gate-keeping and hostages.
1. Gate-keeping
Bankers gather information about a prospective issuer through
two distinct processes. First, bankers select among potential can-
didates those firms they believe meet a certain quality standard
and are ready to consider "going public." Second, the lead under-
writers chosen to lead a stock offering conduct an intensive "due
diligence" or investigation process, which can often take months,
to verify the quality and accuracy of the information that the issu-
ing firm will disclose to potential investors. During the due dili-
gence process, bankers work with issuers to prepare a registration
statement, including a prospectus to be provided to potential in-
vestors, containing that information that is filed with the SEC and
the NYSE. The registration statement must contain all material
information necessary for a reasonable investor to decide whether
or not to purchase the offered security, including financial state-
38. Id. at 576.
39. Id.
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ments prepared by management that are audited by an outside
accounting firm. The registration process gives bankers an oppor-
tunity to evaluate the management and business prospects of an
issuing firm, and also to build long-term personal relationships
with managers. Obtaining information through first-hand contact
with firms is a time-tested method. For instance, De Long de-
scribes the early 20' century role of J.P. Morgan's "men" in im-
proving firm management through Morgan's investment banking
relationship with such firms. °
2. Hostage exchange
Solving the lemons problem requires more than gate-keeping,
however. Keeping issuers honest is an on-going problem. To con-
front this problem we believe that bankers engage in the exchange
of hostages. Bankers use the IPO process to extract hostages from
issuer insiders. These hostages help align the incentive of issuers
to disclose with the need of investors for quality information.
a. Hostages
The idea of using hostage exchange to align incentives is sug-
gested by Oliver Williamson.4 According to Williamson, in a
transaction, buyer and seller offer each other hostages to guaran-
tee against cheating. If the buyer cheats, the seller may keep the
hostage posted by the buyer; if the seller cheats, the buyer keeps
the hostage posted by the seller. Examples of hostages have, in
practice, been hard to find, especially in a buyer-seller context.
However, Kuan offers evidence of hostage exchange among ven-
ture capitalists in the early period of venture capital activity on
the east coast.4" In that setting, a lead VC's role as the manager of
an investment in a start-up places him in a position to cheat a
less-informed fellow investor. A VC who has a close or proprietary
relationship with an entrepreneur can use the resulting asymme-
try to cheat through shirking or misrepresenting information. In
this case, Kuan found, the incentive to cheat fellow members of a
VC syndicate was mitigated by a reciprocal investment that
placed the lead investor in a follower position in a subsequent
start-up with fellow VC's. That is, in the first start-up, one VC is
40. De Long, supra note 7.
41. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996).
42. Kuan, supra note 5.
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the leader and the other VC is the follower. In the next start-up,
the VC's swap roles. This swapping of leadership roles provides
each VC the opportunity to punish cheating. The result of the
hostage exchange is deterrence.
In the VC setting, hostages are effectively generated and thus
can be exchanged because the lead VC is an active manager of its
start-up. A lead VC's efforts influence business outcomes; there-
fore, if a lead VC shirks, the start-up suffers. Thus, VC's know
that the hostage exchange process is significant. At the NYSE,
CEO's and other top insiders influence the outcome of firms;
bankers only obtain quality information from firms if they can
threaten senior insiders. So, it is the CEO from whom a hostage
must be extracted, if truthful information about a firm is to be ob-
tained.
b. The IPO process
One way we think bankers extract hostages is to use IPO alloca-
tions. When a corporation decides to conduct a public offering of
its securities, it will typically contract with an investment bank to
serve as the lead manager of the offering process."' The lead man-
ager will usually organize an underwriting syndicate in order to
spread the risk of completing the offering among several invest-
ment banks. The lead manager will reap the largest fees from the
offering, and has the right to determine the relative size and
structure of the "allocation" of securities. A certain percentage of
securities will be allocated to institutional investors, usually
around 70% of the overall offering, with the remaining 30% allo-
cated to retail investors. There are several competing pressures
faced by the lead manager during the allocation process. On the
one hand, if the offering is on a "firm commitment" basis, the un-
derwriting syndicate and the issuer will enter into an underwrit-
ing agreement, obligating the banks to purchase the entire offer-
ing amount. Thus, the banks put their own capital at risk and are
under pressure to "build a book" of investors who indicate an in-
terest in the purchase of the securities once the SEC registration
process is complete. There is also an interest in placing the shares
with investors who are willing to hold them for a relatively long
period of time. Issuers typically view such a shareholder base as
43. It is technically possible, but relatively unusual, for an issuer to offer its securities
without the assistance of a financial intermediary such as an investment bank.
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easier to manage, and the wider market enjoys a more efficient
price because long term, particularly institutional, holders are
often in a better position to monitor managers. For this reason,
lead managers impose a penalty on broker-dealers who place
shares with customers that "flip" their allocated shares too
quickly."'
To see how volatile prices can be if large investors also flip, con-
sider the Internet bubble experience of the late 1990s, when even
normally restrained IPO shareholders began to flip. Ljungqvist
and Wilhelm found that:
In 1996, first-day returns on initial public offerings averaged
about 17 percent (median: 10 percent). In 1999, first-day re-
turns averaged 73 percent (median: 40 percent) before tapering
off to 58 percent (median: 30 percent) in 2000. Internet IPO's
averaged a stunning 89 percent (median: 57 percent) during
1999 and 2000. These average returns dwarf those from earlier
periods and are the most widely recognized feature of what is
now commonly referred to as the "dot-coin bubble." 5
Similarly, Ritter and Welch find first day "underpricing" averaged
only 7% in the 1980's, yet shot up to 65% in 1999 and 2000.46 Prior
to this anomalous period, however, bankers could ordinarily count
on allocating shares in new offerings to clients who would hold
those shares for an extended period of time. In that case, those
clients might be risking a sacrifice; over a 5-year period, IPO
shares performed below the market. 7
c. IPO allocations as hostages
Allocating IPO shares to clients allows bankers to achieve two
goals. Price stabilization is the first, but creating mutual depend-
encies is the other. Like interlocking directorships, IPO alloca-
tions create personal and business connections among issuer in-
siders. In a rare public disclosure of this practice, Citigroup, the
44. CHARLES JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE
SECURITIES LAws, 71-72 (1997).
45. Alexander Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., IPO Pricing in the Dot-corn Bub-
ble, 58 J. FIN. 723 (2003).
46. Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57
J. FIN. 1795 (2002).
47. Loughran, Tim and Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23 (1995); Jay Ritter, The
Long-run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 42 J. FIN. 365 (1991).
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parent company of investment bank SalomonSmithBarney (SSB),
provided a description of the IPO allocation process to the U.S.
House of Representatives, in response to a subpoena issued during
a Congressional investigation in 2002. One bank document lists
the allocations made to more than two-dozen people, many of them
CEOs at publicly listed firms.48 Under ordinary (non-bubble) cir-
cumstances, these CEOs would hold onto their IPO shares, thus
becoming partial owners of the newly listed firm. The CEOs are
then vulnerable to drops in share price caused by insider shirking
or fraud. This vulnerability places the new firm under increased
scrutiny by fellow CEOs. Also, to the extent that fellow CEOs can
punish each other for transgressions, perhaps through foreclosure
of any future dealings, this creates an incentive to disclose infor-
mation.
This interpretation of IPO allocations is, of course, exactly the
opposite of what IPO allocations came to represent, namely a
perk. As indicated above, in the late 1990s a significant increase
in the price of IPO shares during the first few days of trading was
almost guaranteed. The most notorious recipients of these un-
usual allocations were the so-called "Friends of Frank," a circle of
prominent CEO's and other senior insiders in Silicon Valley who
regularly received IPO shares from prominent investment banker
Frank Quattrone of CSFB.49 Because tech boom era stocks consis-
tently exhibited significant price hikes in the immediate post-IPO
period, these allocations were viewed more as more akin to a bribe
to win new clients than as a hostage aimed at ensuring quality
disclosure from issuers over a longer period of time.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
On March 8, 2006, the opening bell at the NYSE was greeted by
a mixture of applause and boos. Announcing the arrival of a pub-
licly traded for-profit NYSE, the negative reaction came mostly
from the exchange's own floor traders. For them, the implications
of demutualization were clear: an end to their way of life, as floor
trading is gradually replaced by on-line order matching. Execu-
tives at the NYSE are also being replaced, one after another, by
Archipelago executives. The replacement of the NYSE by a super-
48. Jane C. Sherburne, Citigroup, Letter to Hon. Michael G. Oxley and Hon. John J.
LaFalce, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Aug. 30, 2002.
49. Pradnya Joshi, Rise and Fall Of Banking Star; Quattrone Rode Tech Boom, Bust,
NEwSDAY, April 24, 2003, at A44.
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sized Archipelago, and the plans of John Thain, the NYSE Group's
CEO, to acquire overseas exchanges, is part and parcel of what we
predict at the NYSE, namely, a gradual degradation of quality.
As the world's premier stock exchange, the NYSE has had imi-
tators around the world. Yet it has maintained a position of lead-
ership, with the highest valuations, the largest market capitaliza-
tion, and the biggest trading volumes, even without the largest
number of issuers." Incumbency alone, however, cannot explain
this superior performance, as entrants have tried and failed over
time to displace the NYSE. One explanation for the NYSE's per-
formance is its higher level of integrity, i.e., its successful resolu-
tion of the lemons problem. One way it may have solved the lem-
ons problem is through the use of a hostage exchange system em-
bedded within the nonprofit form. For various reasons, including
the difficulty of observing the system itself, this solution is diffi-
cult to imitate. It may also be the case that over time those who
recognize the advantage of a hostage based system have moved
into other settings, particularly the private equity world where as
suggested, at least as far as the VC environment is concerned,
there is an established hostage exchange process. That leaves the
public trading markets exposed to the potential downside of a
slide into a hostage-free world of commoditized trading.
Under the nonprofit model, exchange-owning bankers had an
incentive to be selective about which firms traded on the NYSE.
Solving the lemons problem led to greater investor confidence and
hence liquidity, which in turn meant more and higher underwrit-
ing fees. Increased activity by small individual investors would
profit broker-dealers directly rather than investment banks which
deal only with issuing firms and large investors. So limiting the
firms that trade on the NYSE to only those who meet certain list-
ing standards and whose most important managers post hostages
benefits bankers through higher fees from listed firms. Banks
thus profit only indirectly from greater liquidity.
A for-profit exchange, like Archipelago, profits directly from li-
quidity, charging investors for each buy or sell transaction. A for-
profit exchange benefits only indirectly from investor confidence
that results from solving the lemons problem, so maintaining the
quality of firms and the quality of information is of interest only
50. Hughes and Authers, supra note 3, at 13 ("The market value of companies traded
on New York's floor is $21,000 billion - more than the Tokyo, London, Nasdaq, Euronext
and Deutsche Boers exchanges combined.").
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indirectly. Given these incentives, we would predict a reduced
incentive for the new for-profit NYSE to maintain informational
integrity. In turn, this is likely to lead to an increase in the
growth rate of firms allowed to list and hence an overall decline in
investor confidence.
One question arises from our dire predictions, namely, if the
mutual form of organization is so great, why would the exchange
choose to demutualize? One possibility is that a form of market
segregation is now occurring in capital markets. Technological
change is both driven by, and combined with, the rise of institu-
tional investors who value speed of execution over best price.
Thus, with the growth of web-based computing power, a market
for trading as a commodity has opened up. That has created a
new form of competition for the traditional exchanges from the
alternative trading systems, first Nasdaq and then Archipelago,
Instinet and others. Rather than beat them, the NYSE has de-
cided it is best to join them. Meanwhile, private equity and other
forms of off-exchange trading of financial instruments seem to of-
fer much higher rewards to individuals who might have gone into
traditional investment banking several years ago.
In the off-exchange world, it is once again possible to recreate
stable hostage systems. This is particularly the case in markets
that are controlled by certain key players with a first mover ad-
vantage: those who build the club, so to speak, get to set the rules.
One of us has already demonstrated the importance of this ap-
proach to understanding the origins of the highly successful ven-
ture capital environment.51 It now remains to apply the approach
pioneered by Williamson to the emerging frontiers of finance.
51. Kuan, supra note 5.
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